By: Pierre Bono

As a diplomat and scholar, Henry Nau has spent his career in and around the U.S. government studying and applying U.S. foreign policy, most prominently as a member of President Ronald Reagan’s National Security Council. He served as a senior staff member responsible for international economic affairs from 1981-1983. Most recently, and the reason for his visit to Suffolk University Professor Nau has authored a new book, “Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan.” He currently teaches at George Washington University.

During his time in Reagan’s National Security Council, Nau outlined the administration’s position on international affairs in two principal objectives: negotiate from strength and end the Cold War. During a time of great tension and uncertainty on the international stage between two drastically opposed super-powers in the U.S. and Soviet Union, Nau iterated a strong desire on the part of the Reagan administration to “rebuild our national defense structure, as well as revitalize the domestic economy,” after the turbulence of the 1970’s.

With regard to his position as a senior member in charge of economic affairs Nau was tasked with establishing a framework to reassure our allies that U.S. economic policies were geared to establish long-term benefits that would prove to be worthwhile in a rapidly modernizing world. In addition, he served as emissary to several G-20 summits on the part of the U.S. government in an effort to solidify economic intentions while also fostering diplomacy. In order to incite economic growth and establish the capitalist spirit abroad, the Reagan administration was committed to further opening and liberalizing international investment markets that had long been closed and stunted by the Bretton Woods system. Although some may point to the globalization of world economies as having created a greater disparity in wealth across the world, Nau contends that the progress achieved in the latter part of the 20th century has increased equality. He points to Brazil, Turkey, India, and China as states that have seen large growth in terms of middle class populations who now see their respective places across the globe increasing in relevance and power.

In terms of international diplomacy, Nau has served for the last 25 years as the director of the U.S./Japan/South Korea Legislative Exchange Program which began as an informal, bilateral, meeting between U.S. and Japanese legislators in an effort to break down culturally and economically induced tensions that were hurting U.S./Japanese trade in the late 80’s and early 90’s because of the non-reciprocal intrusion of Japanese car and technology companies into U.S. markets. Korea was later added to the fold as a result of the extraordinary success of the program between the U.S. and Japan. As a means of breaking down barriers and strengthening diplomatic ties, Nau spoke proudly of the efforts and relationships that have been given and developed during his time with the exchange. The level of transparency and cooperation that accompanies such informal, non-publicized, eye-to-eye meetings has led Nau to declare the program as having “succeeded beyond expectations,” by way of clearing the air, and paving the way for greater growth and collaboration within the economic sphere.

As a school of thought regarding the place of the U. S. within the international community, Nau’s most recent work is a criticism of three established theories of foreign policy: Liberalism, realism, and nationalism. His critique however does not discredit or repudiate any one of these theories altogether, but instead tries to reconcile them into a coherent hybrid system that accounts for the ebb and flow of U.S. involvement in the international sphere over the past century, from World War I through the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Nau sees the U.S. as falling victim to “repeating historical patterns of overreaching and withdrawal” which he contends has left us vulnerable to either weak international institutions or drawn out, and misguided occupations. The goal of his perspective, conservative internationalism, is to demonstrate “the lesser use of force early, to prevent the later use of greater force,” doing so will, in theory, force the opposition to come and negotiate for lack of other viable options. The end prospect being compromise, this school of thought serves to utilize the means of strength and influence embodied within the U.S. to “rebuff contra-beneficial efforts outside of diplomatic negotiations,” as demonstrated by Reagan and his policies towards the gradual constriction and isolation of the Soviet Union which some consider to have caused the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end game of these coerced negotiations has been, and ought to continue as, “moving the needle of democracy forward, by offering them a way out, our way.”